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Abstract
The ideology of evidence-base medicine (EBM) has dramatically altered the way we think,
conceptualize, philosophize and practice medicine. One of its major pillars is the appraisal and
classification of evidence. Although important and beneficial, this process currently lacks detail and
is in need of reform. In particular, it largely focuses on three key dimensions (design, [type I] alpha
error and beta [type II] error) to grade the quality of evidence and often omits other crucial aspects
of evidence such as biological plausibility, reproducibility, generalizability, temporality, consistency
and coherence. It also over-values the randomized trial and meta-analytical techniques, discounts
the biasing effect of single centre execution and gives insufficient weight to large and detailed
observational studies. Unless these aspects are progressively included into systems for grading,
evaluating and classifying evidence and duly empirically assessed (according to the EBM paradigm),
the EBM process and movement will remain open to criticism of being more evidence-biased than
evidence-based.
"All scientific work is incomplete – whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable
to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the
knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time".
Sir Bradford Austin Hill [1]
Introduction
The widespread acceptance of the principles of Evidence-
Based Medicine (EBM) have generated a significant para-
digm shift in clinical practice, medical education and in
how studies are designed, reported, appraised and classi-
fied [2,3]. The general principles of EBM are now consid-
ered as the golden standard for appraising the quality and
strength of evidence created through clinical research
[2,3]. These principles also allow for evidence to be classi-
fied into different "levels" according to specific character-
istics. From these categorical levels of evidence,
recommendations are generally issued, each with its own
"grade" [4]. (Table 1) These summary recommendations
on evidence are then typically used to influence clinical
practice through consensus conferences, clinical practice
guidelines and systematic reviews or editorials on specific
aspects of patient care [5,6].
In this commentary, we will argue that the present sys-
tem(s) for classifying the quality of evidence and subse-
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benefit from reform. A reformed method for classifying
evidence should integrate additional dimensions of evi-
dence not traditionally considered, as well as incorporate
a method of assigning weight to each dimension when
determining the overall quality of the evidence. In this
context, we will further comment on the newly proposed
hierarchal system, the Grades of Recommendation Assess-
ment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system, for
gauging the quality of evidence and strength of recom-
mendations from research evidence [7]. The objective of
our reflections is to generate further dialogue and discus-
sion about how we currently evaluate evidence from
research and how we might improve such evaluation.
Prediction, truth, and evidence
Ideally, physicians would be able to predict the biological
future and clinical outcome of their patients with unbi-
ased certainty and naturally use this knowledge in their
care. As an example, physicians would know that the early
administration of tissue plasminogen activator (tPA) to a
patient with acute massive pulmonary embolism would
lead to survival where other interventions would not [8].
Moreover, the physician would also know with certainty
that the patient would not suffer any harm as a conse-
quence of having received tPA.
Regrettably, we cannot predict the biological and clinical
future with such certainty. Rather, the physician can only
be partly reassured by knowing "the operative truth" for
questions about this intervention: What would result if all
such patients with massive pulmonary embolism were
randomly allocated to receive either tPA or an alternative
treatment? Would one intervention significantly increase
survival over the other? By what magnitude would sur-
vival increase? How would such an increase in survival
weigh against the potential harms? The physician could
then apply knowledge of the "operative truth" about such
interventions to guide the course of patient care.
Yet again, such truth in absolute terms is unknown.
Rather, physicians are dependent upon estimation and/or
measures of probability of the truth for predicting the bio-
logical and clinical future of interventions. Naturally, we
obtain and apply estimates of the effects of an interven-
tion through the generation of "evidence".
Evidence, can be derived from a multitude of sources:
from personal experience, teaching by mentors, local
practice patterns, anecdotes, case series, retrospective
accounts, prospective observations, non-interventional
controlled observations, before-and-after studies, single
centre randomized evaluations, randomized evaluation in
multiple centres in one or more countries to blinded ran-
domized multi-centre multi-national studies. The evi-
dence generated in each of these forms has both merits
and shortcomings. Nonetheless, the focus of this discus-
sion is an examination of how the medical community
currently formally appraises, classifies and grades the var-
ious forms of evidence.
The process of understanding how new, evolving or "best
evidence" is translated into knowledge integrated into
patient care remains a great challenge [9,10]. All physi-
cians would generally agree that the provision of high
quality care in medicine would, at a minimum, mandate
that clinical practice be consistent with the current "best
evidence" [11]. Naturally, as a consequence of this notion,
numerous evidence hierarchies for classifying and gener-
ating recommendations have arisen to aid the busy physi-
cian in decisions about management of patients [12].
While they may all have a common theme, to promote the
use of "best evidence" in clinical practice, their redun-
dancy may add confusion and threaten to dilute the over-
all value of EBM [13].
The evidence hierarchy
The "evidence hierarchy" should emphasize that evidence
exists on a continuum of quality. Simply, the evidence
generated from some study designs is logically more
prone to bias than other designs and, as a consequence,
has traditionally provided a weaker justification for influ-
encing clinical practice [13]. Unfortunately, as the levels
of evidence have traditionally been expressed as step-wise
increases in strength (levels), they have failed to empha-
size such continuity.
The apex of the pyramid of evidence has generally been
considered the well-conducted and suitably-powered
Table 1: Summary of a simplified evidence hierarchy, A) Levels 
of evidence across clinical research studies, and B) Grading of 




Level I Well conducted, suitably powered RCT
Level II Well conducted, but small and under powered RCT
Level III Non-randomized observational studies
Level IV Non-randomized study with historical controls
Level V Case series without controls
B)
Grades of Recommendations
Grade A Level I
Grade B Level II
Grade C Level III or lowerPage 2 of 11
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randomized trial. Such a trial would be characterized by
demonstration that intervention X administered to
patients with condition A leads to a significant improve-
ment in a clinically-relevant and patient-centred outcome
(i.e. survival), when compared to placebo, assuming a
genuine and plausible treatment effect of intervention X.
By all current evidence hierarchies, this would be consid-
ered as level I evidence that intervention X works for con-
dition A. (Table 1) These findings would generally elicit a
strong recommendation (i.e. Grade A) to conclude that
intervention X would benefit patients with condition A,
assuming no contraindications and that the patients ful-
filled all the necessary inclusion/exclusion criteria used to
enrol patients in the trial. Yet, there may be circumstances
where a strong recommendation may not be appropriate for
such a trial. This may occur when an intervention does not
lead to or is not correlated with improvements in a clini-
cally-relevant patient-centred outcome, when a trial
employs, as a primary outcome, a surrogate measure (i.e.
physiologic or biochemical endpoint) or when the appar-
ent harm related to an intervention outweighs the benefit.
Under these conditions, a lower grade of evidence may be
assigned (i.e. Grade B).
In the absence of suitably-powered multi-centre multi-
national blinded placebo-controlled randomized trials,
many would also regard a high-quality systematic review
as level I evidence. Yet, systematic reviews require vigilant
interpretation and should not necessarily be considered as
high level evidence due to issues related to poor quality,
incomplete reporting and the inclusion of evidence from
trials of poor quality [14,15]. We contend that systematic
reviews/meta-analyses represent an important hypothesis
generating activity. However, meta-analysis are not pri-
mary evidence, they are statistically assisted interpreta-
tions of primary evidence. They have been shown to
contradict by confirmatory trials, especially when such
meta-analyses are based upon small, low quality studies
[16]. We argue that meta-analyses, while perhaps having
an important role for the synthesis of previous or current
evidence, emphasizing deficiencies and creating a
research agenda [17], they should not be used for devising
recommendations. As such, should likely be de-empha-
sized and/or even removed from any classification of evi-
dence in a reformed classification system.
This archetypal hierarchal system would appear reasona-
ble and not in need of reform. Yet, we also contend that
traditional hierarchal systems have broadly focused on
only three dimensions for defining, classifying and rank-
ing evidence: study design; probability of an alpha or
type-I error; and probability of beta or type-II error. We
consider these fundamental aspects of trial design for evi-
dence hierarchies below and further discuss a recent initi-
ative (the GRADE system) to improve and standardize
how evidence generated from clinical research is classified
and graded. Before embarking upon a detailed discussion
of the tools used to assess the quality of evidence, we wish
to emphasize that no EBM tool can be possibly expected
to answer all questions related to evidence. We further
notice that a good randomized controlled trial is neither
necessary nor sufficient to change practice. However, as
we argue below, both are perfectible in specific directions.
The Grades of Recommendation Assessment, 
Development and Evaluation (GRADE) System
An updated scheme for grading the quality of evidence
and strength of recommendations has been developed by
the GRADE Working Group http://www.GradeWorking
Group.org[7,12,18,19]. The primary aim of this informal
collaboration was to generate broad consensus for a con-
cise, simplified and explicit classification system that
addressed many of the shortcomings of prior hierarchal
systems. Moreover, the GRADE Working Group proposed
to improve the standardization and transparency of grad-
ing evidence and formulating recommendations when
translating research evidence into clinical practice.
The GRADE system defines the "quality of evidence" as
the amount of confidence that a physician may have that
an estimate of effect from research evidence is in fact cor-
rect for both beneficial and harmful outcomes [7]. A glo-
bal judgment on quality requires interrogation of the
validity of individual studies through assessment of four
key aspects: basic study design (i.e. randomized trial,
observational study), quality (i.e. allocation concealment,
blinding, attrition rate), consistency (i.e. similarity in
results across studies) and directness (i.e. generalizability
of evidence). Based on each of these elements and a few
other modifying factors, evidence can then be graded as
high, moderate, low or very low [7]. (Table 2)
The "strength of a recommendation" is then defined as
the extent in which a clinician can be confident that
adherence to the recommendation will result in greater
benefit than harm for a patient [7]. Furthermore, there are
additional important factors incorporated into the
GRADE system that affect the grading of the strength of a
recommendation such as target patient population, base-
line risk, individual patients' values and costs.
The GRADE system represents a considerable improve-
ment from the traditional hierarchies of grading the qual-
ity of evidence and strength of recommendations and has
now been endorsed widely by a spectrum of organizations
and societies (For details visit: http://www.gradeworking
group.org/society/index.htm). Yet, we believe there
remain elements of evidence from research that have notPage 3 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:23 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/23been explicitly addressed in the GRADE system and
require further consideration and debate as discussed
below.
Traditional measures of the quality
Study Design
The design of a clinical trial is a central determinant of its
performance and outcome. The principles of EBM would
typically focus on several simple key components of study
design, such as measures aimed at reducing the probabil-
ity of bias (i.e. randomization, allocation concealment,
blinding). This philosophical stance assumes that the ran-
domized controlled trial represents the "gold standard" as
the most scientific and rigorous study design available
[20]. Accordingly, for a trial to be classified as level I evi-
dence, it essentially requires incorporation of all of these
elements into the design. This approach, while meritori-
ous, often fails to consider additional aspects of study
design that warrant attention [21].
First, as an example, in the ARDS Network trial evaluating
the impact of low tidal volume ventilation in critically ill
patients with acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS)
on mortality, it now appears that, in the study centers, not
all patients allocated to the control group were given a
current or near-current accepted therapy or standard of
practice. Second, this pivotal trial cannot be easily classi-
fied according to the GRADE tool. It is unclear how one
can classify trials that assess the implementation of proto-
cols or changes in process of care, which, cannot be
blinded [22]. Despite being an unblinded protocol-driven
trial, such trials provide the best possible evidence in the
field. Assessment of such processes is complex. Clinical
trial designs incorporating fixed treatment protocols risk
the creation of "practice misalignment". This term refers
to the disruption of a fundamental concept in clinical
medicine: the relationship between illness severity and
the allocated intervention in the control group [23]. The
unintended consequence of such trials, as also demon-
strated in the ARDS Network Trial and the Transfusion
Requirement in Critical Care (TRICC) Trial, may be the
formation of non-comparable subgroups across both allo-
cated therapies that potentially lead to harm and generate
bias [23-25]. No discussions of these complex interactions
Table 2: Overview of the GRADE system for grading the quality of evidence (Adapted from Reference[7]): A) Criteria for assigning 
grade of evidence; B) Definitions in grading the quality of evidence.
A)




Any other type of research evidence Very low
Increase level if:
Strong association (+1)
Very strong association (+2)
Evidence of a dose response gradient (+1)
Plausible confounders reduced the observed effect (+1)
Decrease level if:
Serious or very serious limitations to study quality (-1) or (-2)
Important inconsistency (-1)
Some or major uncertainty about directness (-1) or (-2)
Imprecise or sparse data* (-1)
High probability of reporting bias (-1)
B)
Definitions for levels of evidence
High Further research is not likely to change our confidence in the effect estimate
Moderate Further research is likely to have an important impact on our confidence in the estimate of 
effect and may change the estimate
Low Further research is very likely to have an important impact on our confidence in the 
estimate of effect and is likely to change the estimate
Very Low Any estimate of effect is uncertain
*Few outcome events or observations or wide confident limits around an effect estimatePage 4 of 11
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treatment for illness intensity currently exist or are part of
EBM assessment tools.
Second, how can we classify, categorize and compare trials
of surgical interventions or devices (i.e. extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation (ECMO), high-frequency oscilla-
tory ventilation (HFOV), continuous renal replacement
therapy (CRRT)) where true blinding is impossible [22]?
Finally, do the study investigators from all centres have
genuine clinical equipoise on whether a treatment effect
exists across the intervention and control groups? If not,
bias could certainly be introduced.
We contend these questions suggest a need for further
refinement of how we classify the quality of evidence
according to study design. At minimum, this should
include principles on how to classify device and "bundle
of care" trials and how to incorporate a provision that
demonstrates that, as a minimum, the control arm
received "standard therapy" (which of itself would require
pre-trial evaluation of current practice in the trial centres).
Type I Error (Alpha)
A Type I or alpha error describes the probability that a trial
would, by chance, find a positive result for an intervention
(i.e. effective) when, in fact, it is not (false-positive) and
represent a chance or statistical error. In general, the alpha
value for any given trial has traditionally and somewhat
arbitrary been set at < 0.05. While recent trends have
brought greater recognition for hypothesis testing by use
of confidence intervals, the use of an alpha value remains
common for statistical purposes and sample size estima-
tion in trial design.
The possibility of a type I error is generally inversely
related to study sample size. Thus, a study with a small
sample size or relatively small imbalances across allocated
groups or in the context of numerous interim analyses
might be sufficient, alone or together, to lead to detectable
differences in outcome not attributable to the interven-
tion. Likewise, a trial with few observed outcome events,
often resulting in wide confidence limits around an effect
estimate, will potentially be prone to such an error.
The potential bias due to type I errors can be recognized
by evaluation of key aspects of the study design and find-
ings. These include whether the trial employed a patient-
centred or surrogate measure as the primary outcome,
evaluation of the strength of association between the
intervention and primary outcome (i.e. relative risk or
odds ratio), assessment of the precision around the effect
estimate (i.e. confidence limits), and a determination of
the baseline or control group observed event rate. Level I
evidence mandates that trials have a low probability of
committing a type I error. While desirable, how do we
clinically or statistically measure a given trial's probability
of type I error? Should we adjust the statistical significance
of an intervention found in a clinical trial to the probabil-
ity of a type I error? These questions suggest a need for
both discussion and consensus on the concept of alpha
error and its practical application. This discussion has not
formally taken place in the literature.
Type II error (Beta)
A type II or beta error describes a statistical error where a
trial would find that an intervention is negative (i.e. not
effective) when, in fact, it is not (false-negative). An
increase in sample size and the number of observed out-
come events reduce the probability a type II error, on the
assumption that a genuine difference in effect exists across
the allocated groups. Thus, to minimize the chance of a
type II error, clinical trials must be suitably "powered". In
general, the probability of type II error is conventionally
and arbitrarily set at 0.10–0.20 (i.e. power 0.80–0.90).
The calculation of power is used in study design to deter-
mine and justify the overall sample size. Inadequately
powered trials risk missing small but potentially impor-
tant clinically differences in outcome attributable to the
intervention under assessment [26,27]. Naturally, the
ideal trial is one in which the power is high. Yet, while
maximizing the power of a trial may appear logical, such
an increase has both ethical and cost implications [28].
For a given increase in power (i.e. from 0.20 to 0.10), trial
recruitment would correspondingly need to increase,
potentially exposing a larger cohort of patients to a pla-
cebo intervention and certainly leading to an increase in
trial costs.
Given these implications, should attaining suitable power
for a trial simply be a matter of statistical consideration?
Can we standardize what suitable power represents for a
given intervention? Should we subject suitable power in
trial design to additional public health considerations
such as: the size of the population likely to benefit from
the intervention if proven effective; the clinical relevance
of the outcome being assessed; and the potential down-
stream cost of integrating the intervention in clinical prac-
tice? We also contend that these issues warrant
consideration in the context of trials of equivalency or
non-superiority and more specifically for trials that are
pre-maturely terminated at interim analyses [29-31].
Finally, we believe that future trial design should address
whether estimates of risk reduction used to justify sample
size calculations for an intervention are biologically plau-
sible, are supported by previous preliminary evidence and
are truly feasible while considering the aforementioned
issues.
Additional insights and considerations
In 1965, Sir Austin Bradford Hill described nine issues he
considered important, in a Presidential Address to the Sec-Page 5 of 11
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icine, for potentially inferring causation from statistical
associations observed in epidemiology data [1]. (Table 3)
These considerations were not simply intended as "crite-
ria" as has been widely interpreted, but instead as a prag-
matic and philosophical method to assess the potential
for affecting our confidence in concluding causality. Hill
quoted: "None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisput-
able evidence for or against the cause-and-effect hypothe-
sis and none can be required as a sine qua non". Above, we
considered and discussed the limitations of several tradi-
tional measures to evaluate the quality of evidence, in par-
ticular with a focus on what EBM considers the "old
standard" – randomized trials. Below, we contend that
there are additional dimensions to evidence that merit
attention, both for randomized trials and epidemiologic
studies, when appraising, classifying and grading the qual-
ity of evidence. Moreover, many of these dimensions take
into account the issues identified by Hill when deciding
whether an observed association was a causal relation-
ship.
Evidence from randomized trials does not and cannot
stand on its own, independent of previous information or
studies. As discussed previously, prior knowledge can be
accrued from a variety of sources ranging from personal
experience to in vitro studies, experimental data, epidemi-
ologic investigations and additional randomized trials. In
fact, there may be circumstances for which randomized
trials are unnecessary (i.e. due to obvious and large treat-
ment effect), or more importantly, unethical [20,21]. For
instance, there is an extensive list of historical examples of
widely accepted and uncontested interventions that are
based solely on case-series and non-randomized cohort
studies. (Table 4) By all reasonable consideration, no
human research ethics board would support a rand-
omized trial that compared insulin to placebo for patients
with new onset type I diabetes mellitus or a randomized
comparison of neostigmine versus placebo for initial ther-
apy of proven myesthenia gravis [32,33]. Accordingly, the
systematic methods for how we evaluate and classify evi-
dence need to consider these circumstances.
More recently, there have been high profile examples of
large epidemiologic studies (phase IV studies) of interven-
tions showing previously unknown potential harm [34-
38]. This represents one important aspect of Hill's philos-
ophy that has often been neglected, specifically, the post-
poning of action or the dismissing altogether of new data
due to its limitations of potential harm associated with
interventions. Similarly, we need to consider a means for
incorporating the evolution of evidence and these addi-
tional aspects, such as harm, outside of the usual realm of
randomized trials.
Biological plausibility, temporality, and coherence
These issues were central to Hill's viewpoints and, while
seemingly obvious, are in fact not always evident. For
example, most, perhaps all, reasonable clinicians would
reject the findings of a randomized trial of retroactive
intercessory prayer compared with usual care showing a
statistically significant decrease in the duration of hospital
stay in patients with septicemia [39]. Such a study com-
pletely lacks biological plausibility, along with rejecting
the tenets of temporality and coherence [40]. On the other
hand, perhaps fewer physicians would have rejected the
findings of the first interim analysis of the AML UK MRC
study of 5 courses of chemotherapy compared to 4, where
the investigators showed a 53% decrease in the odds of
death (odds ratio 0.47; 95% CI, 0.29–0.77, p = 0.003)
[31]. Yet the data safety and monitoring committee
decided to continue the trial because these initial findings
were considered too large to be clinically possible, and lacked
biological plausibility and coherence. Accordingly, the com-
mittee recommended the trial be continued and the final
results (no difference between the two therapies) vindi-
cated this apparent chance finding at interim analysis
[31]. These examples both afford an opportunity to high-
light how the results of randomized trials can be influ-
enced by chance statistical findings, however improbable,
and further deviate from the current and recognized
knowledge of the day. To date, there has been no formal
incorporation of "biological plausibility" into the grading
of the quality of evidence or strength of recommenda-
tions. We believe this dimension, along with issues of tempo-
Table 3: Aspects of association to consider prior to the provisional inference of causation as proposed by Sir Austin Bradford Hill 
(Adapted from [1])
Criteria Description
Strength Correlation or relative measures of effect (i.e. risk ratio)
Consistency Across variable studies in design, populations, settings, circumstances, and time
Specificity Intervention causes the effect
Temporality Intervention precedes effect
Biologic Gradient Dose-response curve between intervention and effect
Plausibility Based on the current biologic knowledge of mechanisms of disease
Coherence In the context of knowledge of natural history and related treatments
Experiment Prospective clinical investigations of hypothesesPage 6 of 11
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a reformed classification system. We similarly believe that
careful attention must be paid to robust findings which
contradict current beliefs and concepts of what is biologi-
cally plausible.
Consistency and applicability
Consistency in evidence refers to finding reproducibility
in the effect of an intervention in numerous studies and
across diverse populations, settings, and time. For exam-
ple, the PROWESS trial tested the efficacy of rhAPC in
severe sepsis, however, it was limited in scope by the study
inclusion criteria (i.e. adults, weight < 135 kg, age > 18
years, number of organ failures etc.) [41]. Yet, the evi-
dence for a similar beneficial effect of rhAPC in additional
studies enrolling different populations, in different set-
tings and under different circumstances has been remark-
ably less certain [42-44]. Accordingly, rhAPC has lacked
consistency in the treatment of sepsis. In addition, we also
need to consider the extraordinary cost of rhAPC. The
expense makes its applicability outside of wealthy indus-
trialized countries unfeasible and more likely near impos-
sible [45,46]. While the cost of an intervention clearly has
no bearing on the quality of such evidence, it has major
relevance to its applicability outside of rich countries,
where such treatments are nonetheless heavily promoted
by drug companies. This "population relevance" limita-
tion could be similarly applied to numerous innovations
in medical interventions and can be usefully incorporated
in a grading tool.
Likewise, "complex interventions" which involve devices,
therapies, protocols or processes (i.e. high-frequency
oscillatory ventilation, continuous renal replacement
therapy [CRRT], intensive insulin therapy or medical
emergency teams, early-goal direct therapy for severe sep-
sis) pose major challenges for researchers [22,32]. The
findings of such trials, if negative, often require consider-
ation of whether the "intervention" was ineffective,
whether the "intervention" was inadequately applied or
applied in an inappropriate method, or whether the trial
used an unsuitable design, selected an inappropriate
patient population or used the wrong outcome measures
for determining effect [32]. Conversely, if the "complex
intervention" leads to a beneficial effect, further chal-
lenges arise for how to apply such data in a broader con-
text. In addition, examples of "complex interventions" as
applied in a given trial often imply or assume equity
across an entire infrastructure of medical, surgical and
nursing availability, knowledge, expertise and logistics
[47-51]. Yet, such equity is far less common than appreci-
ated. Moreover, such interventions are often not univer-
sally available. Thus, the translation of a "complex
intervention" in isolation to a setting outside of its initial
development may have both negative health and eco-
nomic consequences. Similarly, one can present a moral
and ethical argument regarding the vast resources utilized
for the development and evaluation of interventions that
are likely to benefit very few and reach even fewer
patients.
We contend that due thought needs to be given to how the
results of a trial can be translated into interventions that
reliably work, are reproducible, are broadly applicable
and can be applied elsewhere. The GRADE system does
incorporate a subjective assessment of consistency as cri-
teria for grading the quality of evidence and, in the setting
of unexplained heterogeneity across trials, suggests a
decrease in grade [7]. We consider that a formal grading of
applicability is needed in future classifications of evidence.
Generalizability
The generalizability of findings from a clinical trial repre-
sents a fundamental dimension of evidence, that of exter-
nal validity. Narrow controls designed to optimize the
internal validity of a trial (i.e. inclusion/exclusion criteria,
intervention protocol) can compete with and compro-
mise overall generalizability [21,52]. Whether an individ-
ual trial is widely generalizable can also be the result of
additional factors. For example, the power of a local inves-
tigator-protagonist needs to be taken into account. Such
investigators, when involved in single centre studies, espe-
cially unblinded ones, have the power to profoundly
influence outcome and behaviour through their commit-
Table 4: Selected historical examples of interventions widely endorsed and seldom contested that are not based on any evidence from 
randomized trials. (Adapted from [63])
Intervention
Blood transfusion for severe hemorrhagic shock
Defibrillation for ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia
Neostigmine for myasthenia gravis
Suturing for repair of large wounds
Closed reduction/splinting for displaced long-bone fractures
Insulin for diabetes mellitus
Directed pressure/suturing to stop bleeding
Activated charcoal for strychnine poisoningPage 7 of 11
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Examples of such studies include use of early-goal
directed therapy, higher volume CRRT, or tight glycemic
control [47,49,51]. All these studies were single centre
evaluation of complex interventions, but importantly, all
had a local protagonist. Alternatively, the findings of a
multi-centre trial of an intervention may not be generaliz-
able if only large tertiary/academic centres were involved,
where there may be a natural predilection to selection
bias.
How generalizable are the findings of a single centre
study, however well designed? Should single centre trials
ever lead to level I evidence or grade A recommendations?
Accordingly, how should we classify the evidence from a
single centre trial showing benefit? For example, would
early goal-directed resuscitation really improve the out-
come of all patients with septic shock presenting to Emer-
gency Departments worldwide or do the findings of this
trial simply reflect improvements in patient care in a sin-
gle institution where there existed a very high pre-inter-
vention mortality [51]? These are more than idle
questions because numerous single centre studies have
profoundly influenced and are continuing to influence
the practice of critical care medicine worldwide and have
been incorporated in international guidelines [53]. Yet,
two recent assessments of interventions that in single cen-
tre studies looked extraordinarily promising (i.e. steroids
for the fibro-proliferative phase of ARDS and introduction
of a Medical Emergency Response Team), failed to show a
benefit when evaluated in a multi-centre setting [48,54].
In the end, there needs to be a greater understanding and
consensus around the limitations of data from single cen-
tre studies. We need to consider the meaning of multi-cen-
tre and how it relates to grading the quality of evidence.
Additionally, we need to consider and discuss the impli-
cations of multi-centre studies sponsored by industry that
evaluate new pharmaceutical interventions. We also need
to relate the control population studied in any single or
multi-centre trial to other large populations with respect
to the same condition, so that we can consider the "gener-
alizability level" of a given study.
Importantly, we also need to give a greater consideration
to the weight of evidence from observational studies in
the context of the known limitations of randomized trials
[20,55,56]. While randomized trials are certainly the most
ideal study design in some circumstances, in other cases
observational studies may in fact be more feasible and
accurate. Well-conducted observational studies have a
pivotal role in the generation of high-quality research evi-
dence and not only serve as an adjuvant to the data gener-
ated from randomized trials. Such observational studies
may enable better "real world" estimates of the impact of
an intervention (including potential harm) compared
with that of a randomized trial of the same intervention
which enrolled patients within tight inclusion/exclusion
criteria [57]. Why do we, by default, rank the randomized
trial higher on current classification scales? How do we
empirically know it to be more robust evidence? Where
are the studies testing how many very large observational
studies have been refuted or confirmed by subsequent
large randomized controlled trial compared with single
centre randomized controlled trials? The recent trial-
based confirmation of the risks associated with aprotinin
during cardiopulmonary bypass and the related FDA alert
(For details visit: http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
early_comm/aprotinin.htm) arose from observational
data and were missed in single centre studies
[34,35,38,57,58]. Even more powerfully, such single cen-
tre studies had led to widespread prescription of beta-
blockers in high-risk patients receiving non cardiac sur-
gery [59]. The recent POISE trial of > 8000 patients dem-
onstrated that such prescription actually increases
mortality [60].
While there are obvious differences in study design, well-
performed observational studies may provide a powerful
mechanism to improve the generalizability of evidence
and may well provide more robust evidence than single
centre randomized controlled trials [20,21,55,56,61,62].
Randomized trials, especially if evaluating complex inter-
ventions or with strict inclusion/exclusion criteria, often
only provide data in a clinical context that does not exist
outside the trial itself and have limited power to detect
harm. Importantly, observational studies have the distinct
advantage of examining the long-term effects or prognosis
of an intervention and, as discussed above, evaluating for
adverse or rare outcome events [34-37]. We contend work
needs to be done to evaluate how prior observational
studies perform in comparison with small or single centre
randomized trials in their ability to detect an effect and
which was subsequently confirmed in at least one large
multi-centre randomized trial. It may well be that such
studies might show that observational studies with appro-
priate detailed variable collection and statistical correc-
tion are statistically more likely to detect beneficial effects
or harm than small or single centre studies. If this were the
case, objective evidence would exist to reform a classifica-
tion system, which was not yet considered this issue.
The need for further reform and consensus
An argument can be made that proposed classification
schemes, especially the new GRADE system, are best left
alone. They are reasonably simple, explicit, have been val-
idated and now are increasingly endorsed. Furthermore,
the additional dimensions of evidence we have discussed
(i.e. study design, biological plausibility, coherence, con-
sistency, and generalizability) are often difficult to simplyPage 8 of 11
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vidual trial approximate the "truth" is hard to quantify.
(Table 5) On the other hand, we believe these issues are
valid and deserve broader discussion, consideration and
debate.
A classification system which is simple is indeed desirable
but becomes a problem when, for the sake of simplicity, it
fails to take into account important aspects of the growing
complexity of the evidence available. Accordingly, sum-
mary classifications of the quality of evidence and
strength of recommendations, such as the GRADE system,
will continue to have an important and expanding role in
medicine. We believe that as the GRADE system becomes
more widely endorsed, additional refinements to the sys-
tem will result in appropriate recognition of higher qual-
ity evidence and contribute to greater confidence in
recommendations for clinical practice. We also believe
that this field is very much "work in progress" and needs
to evolve more explicit recognition and classification of
the dimensions of trial design discussed in this manu-
script.
Conclusion
In this commentary, we have argued in favour of the con-
cept that assessing of the quality and strength of evidence
from clinical studies requires reform. Such reform should,
in particular, reflect those dimensions of evidence, which
are currently not routinely or explicitly addressed. The
GRADE Working Group has made considerable contribu-
tions to improving how the quality of research evidence
and recommendations are graded. We believe that addi-
tional reform is needed to explicitly address and quantify
dimensions of evidence such as biological plausibility,
reproducibility, temporality, consistency, ability to detect
harm and generalizability. We also believe that observa-
tional studies need to be graded and that, under some cir-
cumstances, such studies provide either evidence that
cannot be detected in single centre studies or even better
evidence than produced from small, randomised trials.
We believe such reform should occur through consensus.
We also believe that such reform will have lasting benefi-
cial effects on clinical practice and on the future design,
reporting and assessment of clinical studies.
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